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ABSTRACT: This paper offers a new argument in defence of bacterial species pluralism. To do this, initially I present 
particular issues derived from the conflict between the non-theoretical understanding of species as units of clas-
sification and the theoretical comprehension of them as units of evolution. Secondly, the necessity of the con-
cept of species for the bacterial world is justified; I show how both medicine and endosymbiosis research make 
use of concepts of bacterial species linked to their distinctive purposes which do not conjoin with the other 
available concepts. Finally, I argue that these examples provide a new defence for the philosophical thesis of 
pluralism.
Keywords: bacterial species - endosymbiosis research - pluralism - species concept - unit of classification - unit of evolution.
RESUMEN: Este trabajo ofrece un nuevo argumento a favor del pluralismo de especies en bacterias. Para ello, presento 
los conflictos derivados de la consideración de las especies de modo no teórico, como unidades de clasificación, 
frente a su tratamiento teórico como unidades de evolución. Después, justifico la necesidad de un concepto de 
especie para las bacterias; muestro el modo en que tanto la medicina como la investigación sobre endosimbiosis 
emplean distintos conceptos de especie bacteriana ligados a sus diferentes propósitos que no son coherentes con 
el resto de conceptos existentes. Por último, argumento que estos dos ejemplos proveen nueva evidencia en fa-
vor del pluralismo filosófico.
Palabras clave: especies bacterianas - investigación endosimbiótica - pluralismo - concepto de especie - unidades de clasifi-
cación - unidad de evolución.
Introduction
The ontological status of bacterial species is far from clear. In recent years, several defini-
tions have been offered, but none has been capable of monopolizing the debate and a vast 
amount of literature continues to be published on the issue. Neither biologists nor philoso-
phers agree on one particular concept and when a specific one is proposed, many problems 
arise, concerning both its limits of application and its theoretical strength. It seems as if a 
single concept cannot be found, and we can only propose ideas and yield to criticism. For 
these reasons, the category of species, especially when applied to bacteria, is highly problem-
* I would like to thank David Alvargonzález, Jose Díez, Roger Deulofeu, John Dupré, Luis Valdés, the 
editors of Theoria and the two anonymous referees who made helpful comments on several parts of 
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atic and deserves to be revisited from a philosophical perspective. To do this, here I adopt 
a pluralistic perspective, similar to the views defended by Dupré (1981, 1996, 2001, 2012), 
Ereshefsky (1992, 1998) and Reydon (2005). I argue, following their theses, that all the dif-
ferent bacterial species concepts reflect different extant properties of the prokaryotic real-
ity and thus none of them should be abandoned. Moreover, I defend the notion that there 
is no conflict between approaches; any such perceived conflict arises from our desire to find 
the right notion: the monopolistic definition of bacterial species. Finally, I suggest that more 
research is necessary in order to develop new concepts of bacterial species in medicine and 
endosymbiosis theory.
To achieve this, the paper is divided in six sections. In section 1, I present the particu-
lar issues that stem from the conflict between the methods used to recognize and classify 
species. Those methods are usually either based on structural properties of canonical indi-
viduals or they are theory-laden methods used when considering species as units of evolu-
tion. The issues that arise from this disjunction are common to both the eukaryotic and the 
prokaryotic realms: they are inherent to the very idea of species itself. To continue, in sec-
tions 2, 3 and 4, I discuss the necessity of the concept of species as applied to the bacterial 
world, and I show that medicine and endosymbiosis research require different concepts of 
bacterial species, due to their different goals and ontological commitments. These exam-
ples are particularly intriguing because they reflect the fact that certain classifications work 
much better than others depending on whether we are trying to discover a particular path-
ogen symbiont or commensal or the best treatment for a specific disease. The election of 
the field of endosymbiosis research is due to the recent discoveries of endosymbiotic organ-
isms, which demonstrate the necessity for a new concept of species for prokaryotes, insofar 
as bacteria are almost always involved in those organisms. Finally, in section 5, I argue that 
only a pluralist and pragmatic perspective can shed light on the bacterial species problem, 
and thereby guide both current and future research. Particularly, I defend the notion that 
the examples presented here show how we might carve the same the reality differently de-
pending on our purposes, without generating any conflict between approaches1.2The idea 
will be that the expression “bacterial species” should be seen as a homonymic collection: de-
spite using the same term, the distinct concepts reflect different properties of the bacterial 
world and reveal the ways in which those properties are akin to each other. Furthermore, 
those different concepts do not clash, since they are applied to separate sets of properties 
of the same reality in accordance with distinct scientific discourses. Any possible confusion 
among them would be a category mistake, resulting as a consequence of the homonymic 
character of the term “species”. Therefore, this paper provides a new defence of bacterial 
species pluralism and the more general philosophical position of pluralism.
1 When I refer to “the same reality” or “one and the same reality” I am not attempting to defend an in-
genuous form of realism, as might be supposed. I use this term in an explanatory sense and it must be 
understood, as Quine suggests to understand Quinean ontological relativity: “If you take the total scat-
tered portion of the spatiotemporal world that is made up of rabbits, and that which is made up of un-
detached rabbit parts, and that which is made up of rabbit stages, you come up with the same scattered 
portion of the world each of the three times. The only difference is how you slice it” (1971, 32, emphasis 
added). The way you slice it, I suggest, will have ontological import; and this is thus a form of promis-
cuous realism (Dupré 1996). I am indebted to Luis Valdés for this helpful comment and the relevant 
reference to Quine, which I hope will help avoid misunderstandings of my work.
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1. Species: units of classification or units of evolution?
As has long been known, the idea of “species” is one of the most problematical ideas in 
biology and it is far from clear what a species might be. According to Mayden (1997), at 
least twenty-two different definitions have been proposed since 1940, when Mayr first 
defended the so-called “biological species concept” (BSC). Some years later, Wilkins 
counted twenty-six (2009)2.3In the current literature, many definitions can be found 
which leave the two main issues concerning the “species problem” unresolved: On the 
one hand, there is conflict between the theoretical constraints imposed by certain pro-
posed concepts and the actual operational methods used in the identification of different 
species. On the other hand, there exists a dichotomy: species can be considered either as 
units of evolution or as units of classification of the biological world (Kitcher 1984; Hull 
1997). As Jody Hey has recently recognized: “the species problem is caused by two con-
flicting motivations: the drive to devise and deploy categories [units of classification] and 
the more modern wish to recognize and understand evolutionary groups [units of evolu-
tion]” (2001, 329).
The first problem can easily be related to the second; in general, when referring to 
species as units of evolution, we are considering them from a theoretical perspective: the 
perspective that comes from evolutionary theory. For this reason, the definitions offered 
are usually theory-laden, and theories constrain the methods that can legitimaly be used 
(Laudan 1984). So, those definitions do not seem to be very operational, and therefore the 
taxonomist faces serious difficulties when attempting to apply them. In addition, if the tax-
onomist is a palaeontologist trying to shed some light on extinct species which appear in 
the fossil record, the problem is even more acute, because many of the characteristics or 
properties that are said to be shared by the individuals that belong to the same species can-
not be put to the test. Think, for instance, of the extremely common BSC, according to 
which individuals belong to the same species if they form groups of interbreeding isolated 
populations (Mayr 1940). How can a palaeontologist identify the existence of reproductive 
isolation? In many cases, this goal is simply unachievable, and other concepts are required.
It is worth mentioning here, concerning the treatment of species as units of evolu-
tion, the pioneering work of Willi Hennig (1966), who proposed treating species as mono-
phyletic groups, whereby all the descendants from a common ancestor are treated as mem-
bers of the same species. Despite the controversies that it generated among biologists, 
Hennig’s idea of species inaugurated the cladistics treatment of species and had a major 
impact on subsequent research on systematics, more specifically on phylogenetic research, 
mainly oriented towards evolutionary theory.
In contrast, operational methods are those that are usually applied and required if we 
are dealing with problems of classification; that is to say, if we are trying to classify species 
according to the distinguishable properties they have and which can be easily recognized. 
The best known example of an operational non-theoretical concept used to classify species 
is the phenetic species concept (PSC) defended by Sneath and Sokal in the 1970s (Sokal & 
Sneath 1963). This concept relates species to phenetic clusters of individuals, in such a 
way that two individuals would not belong to the same species unless they shared a large 
2 For a good summary of the main species concepts in use in biology today see Torretti (2010).
94 Javier Suárez
Theoria 31/1 (2016): 91-105
number of traits which are considered to be relevant. This definition is extremely useful if 
we are interested in recognizing some of the most common features of individuals belong-
ing to a defined species; so species are considered as units of classification of the biological 
world. Furthermore, such a definition can easily be applied to many forms of life. How-
ever, it is usually argued that this definition is too fuzzy, because no specific criteria are es-
tablished for signalling out the relevant traits. In fact, this concept was soon abandoned by 
geneticists and evolutionists, since the characters used in it to classify species are not evo-
lutionary ones. Although I will not argue the point here, because it goes beyond the scope 
of the paper, I do not believe this to be problematic: if we are not guided by evolutionary 
theory and what we want is to recognize what kinds of beings there are in the world, we 
need specific methods of recognition which are free from theoretical requirements, the 
latter being undesirable –obviously, we are freed of these requirements in a broad sense be-
cause, as S. Leonelli (2013) has recently pointed out, classificatory activities generate their 
own theories.
The literature concerning species clearly reflects this issue and the perception of con-
flict appears in many different works. Sometimes a theoretical definition is preferred and 
species are said to be exclusively units of evolution; and the focus is on their role in evolu-
tionary theory (Ereshefsky 1992, 1998; de Queiroz 2005, 2007). On other occasions, at-
tention is focused on the role of species as units of classification which can be recognized in 
the biological world. One example of this latter approach would be the following: if we say 
“A is a Leucophaeus scoresbii” (or, in short, a seagull, depending on our personal interests in 
a particular classification), we are allowed to infer that A must have wings and that it must 
be able to fly. Dupré (1999, 2001) has usually advocated such a thesis and he maintains 
that the term “species” should continue to refer to the kind of entities it has always; that is 
to say, to units of classification. In his opinion, when we are referring to units of evolution 
we should use the term “lineage”; lineages, not species, are the entities which evolve.
Keeping all this in mind, I will defend the usefulness of both concepts of “species” in 
biological theory. As Dupré argues, for a long time species been seen as the minimal units of 
classification of the biological world, and they have served their job, so it would be useless 
and irrational to abandon such a well-established term. Classifying species and being able 
to determine certain features of individuals belonging to those groups is very important in 
our daily lives, with reference to both biological and non-biological matters (Dupré 1981, 
1996, chap. 2). Distinguishing, for instance, between poisonous and non-poisonous snakes, 
or between pine and fir trees could make the difference between life and death, or between 
good and bad furniture.
It is nonetheless also true, however, that Darwin, though not claiming to know what 
species might actually be (Origin, chap. 2), entitled his most important book On the origin 
of species; signalling that his theory was about how new species emerge and how they change 
over time. So species were supposed to be what changed through time; that is to say, the 
units on which the many forces of evolution act. Their role in evolution does not, there-
fore, seem disputable. Many philosophers have argued that if we only consider species as 
units of evolution we will pave the way to solving the species problem (Ghiselin 1974; Hull 
1976, 1978). However, as I have attempted to justify and I will try to reinforce, we need to 
consider species both as units of classification and as units of evolution, and then to try to 
cope with the problems that arise.
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2.  Is the concept of species necessary for our understanding of the bacterial world?
The application of the idea of species to the bacterial world has for a long time seemed 
highly problematic. Many authors deny the existence of bacterial species; they consider 
that bacteria do not form differentiated species and that such an idea is either exclusive of 
the eukaryotic world (Margulis & Sagan 2002) or simply misleading (Ereshefsky 2010). 
The main problem is posed by horizontal gene transfer, also called lateral gene transfer 
(LGT): the mechanism by which bacteria transfer genes freely. LGT is said to be infre-
quent and promiscuous (it takes place between relatively extremely genetically distant 
strains of bacteria, sometimes sharing no more than 75% of their genes). LGT is responsi-
ble for the high rate of mutation among prokaryotes and their features, such as the capac-
ity to develop resistance to antibiotics (Cohan 2001, 2002; Franklin 2007; Doolittle & 
Zhaxybayeva 2009; Bapteste et al. 2009). So, LGT complicates the species concept for the 
prokaryotic realm.
The more traditional species concepts, the 70% DNA-DNA hybridization criterion 
and 97% 16S rRNA approach, were merely morphological concepts that failed to cap-
ture important bacterial features other than the rate of hybridization of their DNA or 
their 16S rRNA (Gevers et al. 2005). These concepts are not useful for predicting either 
the sexual characteristics of bacteria or their most significant features, such as their degree 
of virulence, their reaction to particular antibiotics or the kinds of alterations that they 
cause in the reproductive behaviour of the organisms which they interact with. In addi-
tion, LGT complicates the development of new concepts and new methods of recognition 
of bacterial species. Taking those issues into account, while I think that the idea of species 
must be applied to both the eukaryotic and the prokaryotic world, I recognize that much 
work remains in this field and we need to develop new methods and concepts. I will argue 
that these new concepts should be applied to bacteria considered both as units of evolu-
tion and as units of classification of the biological world. So the concept of species must 
be understood in a broad ontological sense; it must be capable of including and emphasiz-
ing different properties, depending on the reasons why it is coined. As noted above, this 
application will always be problematic, because the methods used to classify bacteria are 
not always in harmony with the methods that evolutionary theory requires when bacterial 
species are being considered as units of evolution. Nevertheless, conflict arises from the al-
leged interest that biologists manifest in developing the bacterial species concept, deny-
ing the complexity of the prokaryotic world and the many different properties that should 
be (and normally are) emphasized in particular domains. Normally, such an interest in 
determining the bacterial species concept is defended on the basis of coherence. How-
ever, allowing for the existence of complexity and the necessary plurality that this would 
show those disputes to be empty: different scientists are ultimately talking about different 
things, conditioned by the peculiar requirements of their particular fields of inquiry, and 
thus no real conflict exist. This philosophical position is not hermetic against the possibil-
ity that biologists might one day find properties that would be necessary and sufficient to 
define bacterial species, and which would be equally applicable to all fields of inquiry (ge-
netics, ecology, medicine, endosymbiosis, etc.). However, it is based on the data provided 
by present-day science, which suggest that such a unified concept (the bacterial species 
concept) has not yet been found, and all our current knowledge argues against its exist-
ence.
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To support my pluralist position, I will next consider the ways in which, on the one 
hand, medical practitioners and on the other, endosymbiosis researchers talk about species 
in different ways (stressing different properties) that are ultimately in accord with the in-
ternal structure of their disciplines.
3. Bacterial species as units of classification: the case of medicine
The example to be considered here is the role that bacterial species play in the medical en-
vironment and the way in which a particular concept might be needed or at least prove very 
helpful. As is well-known, bacteria were first discovered as pathogens in the medical re-
searchs of Louis Pasteur. Bacteria cause many diseases among humans, some of which are 
lethal and even catastrophic. Given their importance as originators of disease, doctors study 
many features of bacteria that do not coincide with the characteristics that are of main im-
portance to geneticists (DNA-DNA hybridization, 16S rRNA, etc.), ecologists (Cohen’s 
definition) or evolutionary biologists (the phylo-phenetic species concept or polyphasic 
species concept). This allows for a medical classification of bacterial species which, I will 
argue, is equally valuable, but mostly different from the classifications provided by other 
scientists3.4In order to prove my argument I will first use a real example and later a thought 
experiment specially designed to strengthen the ideas I put forward.
To begin with, consider Yersinia pestis, formerly called Pasteurella pestis, a Gram-nega-
tive bacterium which in humans causes the horrific and lethal disease of plague. Y. pestis is 
responsible for three different kinds of plague, each one classified according to the part of 
the body infected: pneumonic plague, bubonic plague and septicaemic plague. The first in-
fects human lungs and is said to be the most virulent and unusual. Bubonic plague mainly 
attacks the lymphatic system and was responsible for the unfortunately very well-known 
Black Death that reduced European population by one-third in the fourteenth century. 
Finally, septicaemic plague affects the blood stream, although it quickly disseminates and 
infects the whole body. From a genetic, ecological or evolutionary point of view, the mere 
idea of thinking about classifying Y. pestis as three different species would be undesirable: 
the bacteria causing these three different infections are so genetically, ecologically and evo-
lutionary similar that such a division would only complicate our research in a most unpro-
ductive way. However, from a medical perspective, it seems important to distinguish be-
tween the three types of plague for many pragmatic reasons.
First of all, not only the location in the body, but also the transmission vector is dif-
ferent depending on the kind of infection that one has. Septicaemic plague, for instance, is 
not only passed on by the bite of a flea, as usually occurs with bubonic plague; the person 
is usually infected as a result of an open wound in the skin. Pneumonic plague, in contrast, 
3 My defence of the need for an alternative medical classification is not trivial; in the medical literature 
there are such cases. One particularly interesting example is that of Treponema pallidum, the bacteria 
responsible of syphilis. While biologists refer only to T. pallidum, doctors are forced to distinguish dif-
ferent species: T. pertenue, which causes yaws (also called pian or framboesia); T. endemicus, responsi-
ble of bejel (endemic syphilis); and T. careteum, which produces the famous pinta disease. While there 
is no genetic basis for such a classification, medical reasons are pressing enough to sustain it (Perine 
1984; Antal et al. 2002; Cjeková et al. 2012; Giacani & Lukehart 2014).
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is almost always transmitted from human to human by simple inhalation of contaminated 
droplets. The different vectors of transmission involved in the different diseases can re-
quire highly diverse medical procedures in order to avoid new infections, while important 
and very useful generalizations can be made. These generalizations can provide us with the 
grounds to enact only procedures that are necessary and can result in a saving of money or 
the prevention of avoidable alarm.
Secondly, the symptoms do not coincide: in many instances of septicaemic disease, 
symptoms never appear and patients die before knowing they are infected. In contrast, bu-
bonic plague is easily recognizable by means of large blisters situated near the affected lym-
phatic area. Lastly, pneumonic plague normally causes pains in the patient’s chest; a symp-
tom that is very helpful to differentiate this type of plague from the others.
Finally, the evolution and mortality rates are also very different depending on the dis-
ease, which prompts the following assertion: if we differentiate three bacterial species, then 
we will be able to make different generalizations which can be very useful and practical in 
dealing with current and future cases of infection. What is more, such a differentiation of 
three species would be grounded on, first, the peculiarities of the disease in question (ac-
cording to an accepted theory of diseases) and second, medical theory concerning patho-
gens and their responsibilities in disease.4
Now let us consider a thought experiment which I believe is very illuminating. Sup-
pose the following be the case: we have two bacterial strains, A and B, which produce a par-
ticular disease (C) when they are inoculated into humans. The symptoms of C (high fever, 
vomiting and a strong pain in the hands), its treatment and immunological response and 
the vectors of transmission (dog scratch) are the same, regardless of the strain that caused 
it.5 When a sufferer goes to the doctor to find out what disease they are suffering from that 
causes such terrible pain in their hands, the doctor says, irrespective of the particular strain 
that could have caused the disease: “You have C, and this is the best treatment for it; also, 
take precautions with your dog, because it was the infectious agent”. If the patient is inter-
ested in knowing what will happen in the following weeks, the doctor will tell them, again 
irrespective of the particular strain that has infected the unfortunate patient, what the ex-
pected immunological response and evolution of his disease will be, and will encourage 
them to come back if they do not feel better.
Now imagine that a geneticist, interested in classifying bacterial species, obtains a pure 
culture of the two strains, A and B, and determines the rates of DNA-DNA hybridization 
and of 16S rRNA divergence among them. The geneticist shows that this rate is lower than 
the conventionally required 70% and 97% respectively, so classifies them as two different 
species. To strengthen this assumption, suppose that an ecologist, using Cohan’s cohesion 
concept according to which two bacterial species are different when “they reach the point 
that they can survive each other’s periodic selection events” (2002, 463) also determines 
that the strains are two different species. Finally, suppose that another scientist, using the 
so called phylo-phenetic approach which defines bacterial species as “a group of strains that 
4 All the information concerning Y. pestis and the plagues is extracted from Madigan (2004, 918-20).
5 I take this as being the most common marker of bacterial diseases and as a possible way of classifying 
bacterial species from a medical point of view, following Rolain et al. (2004, 1921-1922). Some other 
aspects that could also have been taken into account, such as the rate of antibiotic resistance, have been 
ignored in order to facilitate the exposition of the argument.
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show a high degree of overall similarity and differ considerably from related strain groups 
with respect to many independent characteristics” (Rosselló-Mora & Amann 2001, 53), 
also determines that they are two different species. Therefore, a consensus is reached be-
tween biologists and through the application different criteria; this kind of consensus is not 
usually the rule, but the exception, because normally, diverse criteria cross-classify the bac-
terial world (Franklin 2007; Ereshefsky 2010). Hence, it would seem reasonable to define 
strains A and B as different bacterial species.
The question now, however, is: Should doctors be interested in such a classification 
and require, for instance, a blood test of all patients with the common symptoms of C? 
I certainly do not think so; what is more, I believe it would be useless, and could well be 
harmful and counterproductive. What doctors are interested in are diseases, their proc-
esses of evolution, their degree of virulence and the extant treatments. So, they do not 
need to change their definitions or procedural methods in order to accommodate the cri-
teria of geneticists, ecologists or systematists. Doctors may and should have their own 
criteria for defining bacterial species, and these criteria, though they sometimes seem to 
clash with those established in other branches of science, do not really clash, because they 
are applied from a different perspective; from different fields of inquiry which can legiti-
mately divide up reality (indeed, the same reality) in different ways. In other words: our 
aims and goals in different disciplines can lead to cross-classification of the extant enti-
ties in the world. Although this cross-classification may seem to drive us to a disordered 
world, or to a new Babel (Hull 1999), this is not actually the case, because the cross-classi-
fications are applied to different areas of interest in which we emphasize certain properties 
to the detriment of others. As I believe these examples clearly show, different and alterna-
tive classifications, one highlighting certain properties (genetic, ecological, evolutionary, 
etc.), and the other emphasizing others (medical), can lead us to different classifications 
of the world with significant beneficial and pragmatic results. Thus, the disputes between 
ecologists, geneticists and doctors regarding the classification of Y. pestis or the hypotheti-
cal disease C must be seen as empty; different properties are emphasized and therefore dif-
ferent cross-classifications (in this particular case, in the form of more “fine-grained” clas-
sifications) can exist in perfect harmony.
One could, of course, acknowledge my argument but at the same time point out that 
classifications in biology are orthogonal to the classifications made by doctors: while the 
former try to classify bacteria, the latter classify diseases, and diseases and bacteria are not 
the same thing. Although I recognize that this point can be made, I think it is unfair to the 
kind of work that many doctors do; many doctors are researchers who in fact do try to clas-
sify the extant species of bacteria (cf. Madigan et al. 2004; Prescott 2004). The fact that 
these classifications are goal-oriented towards practical results (the development of vac-
cines, antibiotics, avoiding certain forms of propagation, etc.) does not change the preten-
sions of the classifications themselves. Doctors, like geneticists, do classify bacteria; the only 
difference between them is the goal which guides their different classifications.
4. Bacterial species as units of evolution: the case of endosymbiotic theory
The issue of bacterial species and the different ways of classifying prokaryotes acquires a 
particularly interesting dimension from the point of view of researchers working on endo-
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symbiosis (cf. Booth 2014; Suárez 2015). Endosymbiosis is a biological phenomenon which 
consists of two different organisms belonging to distinct species, called “endosymbionts”, 
living together; host and symbiont are distinguished with the symbiont living inside the 
cells of its host6. Furthermore, as a kind of symbiotic interaction, endosymbiosis encom-
passes three different kinds of interactions: mutualistic interactions, from which both host 
and symbiont benefit; commensalism, which is neutral for both; and parasitism, from which 
the symbiont is benefitted to the detriment of the host. Finally, among endosymbiotic re-
lationships it is useful to distinguish two different ways in which the symbionts might be 
transmitted from progenitors to offspring: transmission may be vertical, if the progenitors 
pass on their own symbionts to their progeny during reproduction; or horizontal, if they do 
not, and the symbionts are acquired from the environment (Moran 2006).
My concern with endosymbiosis research here and its relevance for my arguments on 
bacterial classification are threefold: To begin with, endosymbiosis, in spite of what had 
commonly been believed until recently, should not be seen as a rare phenomenon in na-
ture, but as something quite widespread (Moya et al. 2008). Secondly, bacteria are nor-
mally involved in endosymbiotic interactions, since the hosts usually develop special or-
gans called “bacteriocytes”, which are highly susceptible to having bacteria live in them 
(Margulis 1998; Margulis & Sagan 2002). Finally, as many authors have noted, such bac-
terial consortiums constitute “a mechanism for rapid speciation” (Carrapiço 2010, 136), 
since they frequently cause certain kinds of reproductive isolation in their hosts7. These 
three reasons lead endosymbiotic biologists to worry about prokaryotes and, as I will ar-
gue, to develop new notions of bacterial species that do not necessarily match either in-
tensionally or extensionally with the classifications made by ecologists, geneticists or other 
protistologists. In my argument, I will present the real case of the bacterium Wolbachia 
pipientis to show how the criteria provided by endosymbiosis researchers to classify bac-
teria do not necessarily generate classifications that are extensionally equivalent to those 
used by other biologists.
The case of W. pipientis is particularly renowned among endosymbiosis researchers 
and it is considered a standard for the research in the field. Wolbachia belong to the order 
Rickettsia, as do many other important endosymbionts, and are considered to constitute a 
separate monophyletic group. What is outstanding about W. pipientis is its extension: it is 
widespread and according to recent research, present in approximately 65% of insects spe-
cies (Hilgenboecker et al., 2008). Furthermore, its symbiotic effects are very diverse, rang-
ing from many distinct form of reproductive parasitism in arthropods to mutualism, in 
the case of its relationship with some nematodes. Another very interesting feature of Wol-
bachia is the fact that their phylogeny does not concord with the phylogeny of their hosts; 
6 It should be noted here that in endosymbiotic relationships, in contrast to other kinds of symbiotic re-
lationships (ectosymbiosis), the symbiont lives inside the cells of the host. This definition excludes re-
lationships such as that extant between plovers and crocodiles or Escherichia coli and the human gut 
which are symbiotic relationships, but do not constitute endosymbiosis (Sapp 1994; Archibald 2014, 
chap. 2).
7 The best known (and most scientifically accepted) case is the origin of eukaryotic cells as a result of 
two previously extant prokaryotic organisms merging and thus gaving rise to mitochondria and chlo-
roplasts (Sagan 1967). However, there are many more cases, such as the consortium aphid-Buchnera 
aphidicola (Latorre & Moya 2013) or the origin of Paracatenula (Gruber-Vodicka et al. 2011).
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this suggests “extensive lateral movement of Wolbachia between host species” (Werren et 
al. 2008, 741)8. However, despite their lack of concordance with the phylogeny of their 
hosts, Wolbachia cannot be cultured outside them, which suggests their long-term par-
ticipation in symbiotic relationships. Currently, there is no phylogenetic basis for distin-
guishing different species of Wolbachia, but biologists have distinguished eight different 
strains (Casiraghi et al. 2005). All these features render W. pipientis very interesting both 
from a phylogenetic and from an endosymbiotic point of view.
From an endosymbiotic point of view the most important features of W. pipientis 
are: the fact that it may interact mutualistically with nematodes, whereas it is parasitic 
in its relationship with arthropods; and the variety of reproductive alterations which it 
causes in its parasitic hosts. Four different kinds of reproductive alterations have been 
reported: cytoplasmic incompatibility (CI), parthenogenesis induction (PI), feminiza-
tion of genetic males (FGM) and male killing (MK). All these alterations are considered 
to be mechanisms for rapid speciation and are very important for many other practical 
purposes and applications, such as control of disease vectors or pests. Let us first con-
sider the parasitic effects that W. pipientis may have; later I will turn to the mutualistic 
effects.
CI is the most common alteration that Wolbachia cause in their hosts. It of infected 
males not being capable of successfully mating with uninfected females (unidirectional in-
compatibility) or with infected females that do not harbour the same Wolbachia strain (bi-
directional incompatibility). CI is due to the modifications that W. pipientis causes to the 
sperm of its hosts, modifications which are “rescued” when the host mates with a suitable 
female. CI thus tends to generate reproductive isolation.
PI consists of the asexual reproduction of females which generates new females infected 
by the same strain of Wolbachia as the progenitors. This phenomenon has only been docu-
mented in mites, some wasps and thrips; species in which males develop from unfertilized 
eggs. PI thus tends to eliminate males from the population.
FGM is the process by which genetic males develop as females as a consequence of a 
Wolbachia-induced hypertrophy of the androgenic gland, which inhibits its function. It 
has been documented in isopods and some insects, such as some Lepidoptera (Eurema he-
cabe) and some Hemiptera (Zyginidia pullula). The importance of FGM lies in the fact 
that it might lead to the appearance of new systems of sex determination, such as male het-
erogamety.
Finally, MK has been observed in certain Coleoptera, Diptera, Lepidoptera and Pseu-
doscorpiones. It consists of the killing of males during embryogenesis, to the benefit of fe-
males, which can directly transmit the bacteria. MK is interesting in as much as it can lead 
to the fixation of female populations, to the detriment of the males.
Such a classification of mechanisms induced by Wolbachia that affect reproduction 
is of major importance for endosymbiosis research since “closely related [phylogeneti-
8 It is very important to note that, when a bacterium participates in an endosymbiotic relationship for a 
long time, its phylogeny usually matches the phylogeny of its host. A canonical example is the phylog-
eny of Buchnera aphidicola, which is completely dependent on the phylogeny of the aphids (Brucker & 
Bordenstein 2012; Latorre & Moya 2013). This is why Wolbachia are so interesting from a phyloge-
netic point of view. 
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cally] Wolbachia bacteria can cause quite different effects on their hosts” (Stouthamer et 
al. 1999). Indeed, this fact is still more striking, since there have been documented cases in 
which the same strain of Wolbachia induced different reproductive alterations in different 
hosts. For instance, the same strain of W. pipientis induces CI in Drosophila recens and MK 
in D. subquinaria (Jaenike 2007). This fact means that endosymbiosis researchers, inter-
ested as they are in the evolutionary character of Wolbachia (inso-far as it acts as rapid spe-
ciation mechanism in their host), may classify the parasitic W. pipientis into four different 
categories, depending on the effects it originates in its hosts. Such a classification would be 
different and independent from the classifications made by phylogeneticists, who are in-
terested in different features of the bacteria (mainly genetic); or those made by ecologists 
(C ohan 2002) or by authors following the phylo-phenetic approach (Rosselló-Mora & 
Amann 2001). Indeed, the same phylogenetic, ecological and phylo-phenetic strain of 
W. pipientis would be classified as two different species by endosymbiosis researchers, de-
pending on the possibility of it causing MK in D. subquinaria and CI in D. recens. So, 
where all biologists would distinguish one species belonging to one strain, endosymbiosis 
researchers would distinguish two species.
In contrast, when attending to the possible mutualistic effects of certain strains of 
W. pipientis, endosymbiosis researchers would tend to classify different strains (strains C 
and D) as one species, since they are only found in mutualistic relationships in filarial nem-
atodes. Therefore, where some biologists would find two species (for example, adopting 
Cohan’s approach) and others would distinguish two strains within the same species (phy-
logenetically, as I said, there is only one species: W. pipientis), endosymbiosis researchers 
would recognize just one species9.
In conclusion, endosymbiosis researchers share common practices and are concerned, 
on the one hand, with the distinction between mutualistic and parasitic effects and, on the 
other, with the different reproductive modifications that bacteria induce in their hosts. As 
a consequence, they would classify bacterial species differently from other biologists. How-
ever, as happens in the case of medical classification, the fact that researchers classify bac-
terial species differently should not be seen as a clash with standard methods. Rather, it 
reflects the intrinsic plurality of the world and the fact that different theories generate dis-
tinct classifications of the same reality, depending on the particular properties and arrange-
ments of properties that those theories emphasize. Again, as happened in the case of doc-
tors, cross-classifications only show that different scientific discourses may require distinct 
ways of carving up the world.
5. The road to pluralism
What philosophical morals follow from the examples I have explored above? How should 
we carve up the bacterial or prokaryotic world? I believe that there is not one particular 
preferred way of dividing up the prokaryotic world, but many equally worthy divisions. 
9 Most of the information that I use concerning W. pipientis comes from the excellent review by 
W erren et al. (2008). The particularities of CI, PI, FGM and MK come partially from Werren (1997), 
Stouthamer et al. (1999) and Zimmer (2001).
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Furthermore, the different classifications we might build are not really in conflict with 
each other, but only apparently so, due to the idea that there is one and only one correct 
way of carving up the world. The problem with the “species” notion, when it is applied to 
bacteria according to the different criteria cited above, is that there is not one unique way 
of dividing up the prokaryotic reality, but many; and the particular division that we chose 
on a particular occasion will (and should) depend on our interests. Moreover, the differ-
ent notions are not synonyms, but homonyms, that is to say: there are different concepts 
in the arena that we give the same name to (Reydon 2005). This suggests the possibility 
of conflict and that one of the particular definitions may be more important than others. 
But the evidence suggests just the opposite: the different concepts stress different proper-
ties of one and the same reality (the bacterial world) and, according to the different prop-
erties stressed, different kinds of relations are discovered and different generalizations are 
formulated, so no one concept is more important than the others. Thus, the recognition 
of the existence of different concepts is linked to the recognition of the existence of differ-
ent properties, which can be singled out in different fashions with an important pragmatic 
import.
Clearly, a new and important question now arises: How is it possible that one and the 
same reality (the bacterial world) can be divided up into different classes? If there is one re-
ality, then there should only be one possible classification of it. As Plato observed in Phaed-
rus and in the Sophist, nature must be carved at its natural joints, and scientists have to dis-
cover these joints. So maybe an as yet undiscovered concept will be the key to disentangling 
the complexities of the bacterial world; a concept through which all the different features 
highlighted by different specialists converge. Once this concept is discovered, none of the 
problems posed by the classification of bacterial species will remain. We will have found the 
natural way of carving the world and no confusion will remain. However, the arguments in 
this paper seem to demonstrate that this does not seem possible; the actual evidence from 
medicine and endosymbiosis research suggests just the opposite. Doctors and evolutionary 
biologists, on the one hand, and endosymbiosis researchers and phylogenetic biologists, on 
the other, emphasize very different features and it seems very implausible that we will find a 
new characteristic within which they all converge. The traditional and optimistic assump-
tion within the history of science according to which there is one correct manner of divid-
ing up the world seems wrong; the manner in which we carve up nature depends on our 
interests and one and the same range of objects may be carved up in distinct manners de-
pending on those interests and on the scientific discourses that we are using (Dupré 1996; 
Cartwright 2005).
Furthermore, I have argued that the divisions presented here are pragmatically valu-
able from different standards, and thus they are necessary and helpful; there is no reason to 
eliminate them. With respect to the idea of a cross-classification of reality, I have indicated 
that cross-classification is neither problematic (because different classifications are recog-
nized for different purposes), nor conflictive (because both doctors and endosymbiosis re-
searchers know and easily recognize the criterion that is being used). So, should we prefer 
one particular classification over the others? I do not think so: different purposes lead us 
to distinguish different properties. Those properties are akin in different manners and thus 
they lead us to different classificatory schemes. That said, two criteria will be required for a 
cross-classification of reality to be valid: the different classifications must be motivated by 
different goals (say, for instance, discovering diverse regularities); and they must be proved 
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to be pragmatically valuable. The examples presented here fulfil these requirements, and 
hence the classifications are legitimate.10
6.  Concluding remarks: medical and endosymbiotic bacterial classifications as a new 
argument for pluralism
In this paper, I have presented the bacterial species problem from the point of view of the 
distinction between species as units of evolution and species as units of classification. I have 
justified the necessity of the species concept for the bacterial world and I have shown how 
medicine and endosymbiosis research give raise to different classificatory systems of the 
bacterial world from those presented in other areas of biology (ecology, phylogenetic, etc.). 
Finally, I have argued that these examples show that different scientific discourses gener-
ate different classificatory systems depending on the particular interest of the researchers 
and of the field. Moreover all those classifications reflect extant properties of the bacterial 
world and allow researchers to make interesting inferences, which shows that a pluralist 
and a pragmatic attitude concerning the bacterial species problem is the most adequate in 
the current situation.
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